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NOTES
WILFUL MISCONDUCT AND THE GUEST STATUTE-A
STUDY IN HETEROLOGY
Wilful misconduct, the shadowy area lying between the sphere of intentional
conduct and that of negligence, constituting "a penumbra of what has been called
'quasi-mtent,"" has been a source of much litigation. Although the term "wilful
misconduct" appears in several sections of the Califorma codes, 2 it is most fre-
quenfly encountered by the appellate courts in connection with section 17158 of
the Vehicle Code, the California automobile guest statute. It is the purpose of this
note to determine whether the cases dealing with wilful misconduct as used in
the guest statute have formulated a definition of that term, and, if so, whether
such definition has been uniformly applied.
Two major reasons are given for the existence of guest statutes. They were
enacted, first, to discourage collusive suits between a guest and his host occasioned
by the existence of liability insurance3 and, second, to prevent the apparent in-
justice of holding an accommodating host liable to a gratuitous guest for mere
negligence.4 It was largely through the efforts of insurance company officials and
the insurance lobby that the guest statutes came into existence.5
The original Califorma guest statute was enacted in 19290 as an amendment to
the California Vehicle Act of 1923,7 limiting a guest's recovery to those cases in
which his injury was proximately caused by the driver's intoxication, gross negli-
gence, or wilful misconduct. An amendment in 19318 eliminated gross negligence,
leaving only intoxication and wilful misconduct of the driver as grounds for re-
covery. This was substantially the same as the present statute, which reads in part:
No person who as a guest accepts a ride in any vehicle has any nght
of action for civil damages against the driver of the vehicle on account of
personal injury to or the death of the guest unless the plaintiff in any
such action establishes that the injury or death proximately resulted from the in-
toxication or willful misconduct of the driver.9
Before wilful misconduct may be satisfactorily discussed, the scope of the term
must be limited. Wilful misconduct is neither negligence nor intentional conduct
lProssun, TouTs 188 (3d ed. 1964).
2 E.g., CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 4551, 4553.
8 Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 432, 289 P.2d 218, 224-5 (1955).
4 "As the use of automobiles became almost umversal, the proverbial ingratitude of
the dog that bites the hand that feeds him, found a counterpart in the'many cases that
arose, where generous drivers, having offered rides to guests, later found themselves
defendants in cases that often turned upon close questions of negligence. Undoubtedly,
the legislature, in adopting this act, reflected a certain natural feeling as to the injustice
of such a situation.'c Crawford v. Foster, 110 Cal. App. 81, 87, 293 Pac. 841, 843 (1930).5 PuossEn, ToRTS 190-91 (3d ed. 1964); 1954 INs. L.J. 583, 584.
6 Cal. Stat. 1929, ch. 787, § 1, at 1580.
7 Cal. Stat. 1923, ch. 266, at 517.
8 Cal. stat. 1931, ch. 812, § 1, at 1693.
9 CAL. VumcLE CODE § 17158.
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but rather a combination of both.1 It has been stated repeatedly that wilful mis-
conduct does not require an intent to injure;" yet wilful misconduct has been de-
scribed as "something different from and more than negligence, however gross."' 2
The legislative history of the guest statute shows that the legislators believed that
negligence was legally distinguishable from wilful misconduct.' 3 An early Califor-
ma automobile case attempted to distinguish the terms as follows:
By "negligence" is meant ordinary negligence By gross negligence is
meant exceeding negligence mere inadvertence in a superlative degree.
By "wilful negligence" is meant an intentional failure to perform a man-
fest duty in reckless disregard of the consequences. Such conduct is not
negligence in any proper sense, and the term "wilful negligence" is a mis-
nomer.14
Thus wilful misconduct is not negligence, since the misconduct is intentional, yet
it is not an intentional tort, since the consequences of the act are not intended;
rather there is an absolute disregard as to whether or not those consequences will
occur.
1 5
In Howard v. Howard,'6 one of the first cases to arise under the guest statute
as modified by the 1931 amendment, wilful misconduct was defined as follows:
"Wilful nusconduct miplies at least the intentional doing of something either with
a knowledge that serious injury is a probable (as distingushed from a possible)
result, or the intentional doing of an act with a wanton and reckless disregard of
its possible result."' 7 This definition was adopted by the Califorma Supreme Court
in Meek v. Fowler's and appears in a modified form in the recent case of Reuther
v. Viall:' 9 "Wilful misconduct means intentional wrongful conduct, done either
with knowledge that serious injury to the guest probably will result or with a
wanton and reckless disregard of the possible results "20
As may be seen from the foregoing definitions, wilful misconduct may be shown
in either of two, bipartite, ways. It is either intentional, wrongful conduct done
10 Elliott, Degrees of Negligence, 6 So. CAL. L. REv. 91, 92-5 (1933).
" Van Fleet v. Heyler, 51 Cal. App. 2d 719, 729-30, 125 P.2d 586, 592 (1942).
12 Helme v. Great Western Milling Co., 43 Cal. App. 416, 421, 185 Pac. 510, 512
(1919).
13 Turner v. Standard Oil Co., 134 Cal. App. 622, 626, 25 P.2d 988, 989-90 (1933);
Walker v. Bacon, 132 Cal. App. 625, 626-27, 23 P.2d 520 (1933); Howard v. Howard,
132 Cal. App. 124, 129, 22 P.2d 279, 281 (1933).
14 Tognazzmi v. Freeman, 18 Cal. App. 468, 474, 123 Pac. 540, 543 (1912). A
comparable distinction is made in Helme v. Great Western Milling Co., 43 Cal. App.
416, 421, 185 Pac. 510, 512 (1919).
15 Howard v. Howard, 132 Cal. App. 124, 129, 22 P.2d 279, 281 (1933). An inter-
esting distinction between wilfulness and intentional conduct was made by Judge Mason
of Kansas m Atchison, T. & S.F Ry. v. Baker, 79 Kan. 183, 190, 98 Pac. 804, 807 (1908)-
"The difference is that between hun who casts a missile intending that it shall strike
another and hin who casts it where he has reason to believe that it will strike another,
being indifferent whether it does so or not."
16 Supra note 15.
17 Id. at 129, 22 P.2d at 281.
18 3 Cal. 2d 420, 426, 45 P.2d 194, 197 (1935).
19 62 Cal. 2d 470, 42 Cal. Rptr. 456, 398 P.2d 792 (1965).
20 Id. at 475, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 459, 398 P.2d at 795.
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with knowledge that serious injury to the guest probably will result, or inten-
tional, wrongful conduct done with a wanton and reckless disregard of the possi-
ble results.
Looking at these phrases separately and taking the latter first, let us consider
the term "wanton and reckless." The supreme court held in an early case that
recklessness was synonymous with wantonness, 21 and wantonness was defined as
follows:
[Allthough one might not have the actual intent to injure, still if there is on
his part a reckless indifference or disregard of the natural or probable conse-
quences of his doing or omitting to do an act, and he does or fails to do the act,
conscious, from his knowledge of existing circunmstances and conditions, that his
conduct will likely or probably result in injury, he is guilty of wanton negligence. 22
In Kramm v. Stockton Electric R.R.2 3 the court, in discussing wantonness, con-
cluded: "[W]here the conduct of the defendant exhibits reckless indifference to
probable consequences, with knowledge of facts and circumstances likely to result
in injury, it becomes wanton negligence." 24
There is a conspicuous similarity between these definitions of wantonness and
the definition of wilful misconduct as intentional, wrongful conduct done with
knowledge that serious injury to the guest probably will result. If the two terms
are in fact identical, then the concept of wilful misconduct as intentional, wrong-
ful conduct done with a wanton and reckless disregard of the possible results is
merely a repetition of the frst definition and adds nothing. It has, however, been
contended, both in cases 25 and commentary thereon, 26 that wilful misconduct may
be differentiated from wanton misconduct. The case of Donnelly v. Southern Pa-
cific Co. 27 is most often cited mn support of this point:
Negligence is an unintentional tort, a failure to exercise the degree of care in
a given situation that a reasonable man under similar circumstances would exercise
to protect others from harm. A negligent person has no desire to cause the
harm that results from his carelessness and he must be distinguished from a
person guilty of willful misconduct, such as assault and battery, who intends to
cause harm. Willfulness and negligence are contradictory terms. If
conduct is negligent, it is not willful; if it is willful, it is not negligent. It is fre-
quently difficult, however, to characterize conduct as willful or negligent. A tort
having some of the characteristics of both negligence and willfulness occurs when
a person with no intent to cause harm intentionally performs an act so unreason-
able and dangerous that he knows, or should know, it is Iighly probable that harm
21 
"To commit an act recklessly is to commit it wantonly " Esrey v. Southern
Pacific Co., 103 Cal. 541, 545, 37 Pac. 500, 501 (1894). Prosser, as quoted in Givens v.
Southern Pacific Co., 194 Cal. App. 2d 39, 44, 14 Cal. Rptr. 736, 739 (1961), gives
"wantonness" and "recklessness" the same definition. Pnossm, ToRTs 188 (3d ed. 1964).22 Harrington v. Los Angeles Ry., 140 Cal. 514, 525, 74 Pac. 15, 19 (1903).
23 3 Cal. App. 606, 86 Pac. 738, rehearing dented, 3 Cal. App. 616, 86 Pac. 903
(1906).
24 Id. at 618, 86 Pac. at 904.
25 E.g., McDevitt v. Welch, 202 Cal. App. 2d 816, 825, 21 Cal. Rptr. 251, 257
(1962).26 E.g., Quint, "Wilful Misconduct," "Wanton and Reckless Misconduct," "Gross
Negligence," 40 J.S.B. CAL. 481, 482-83 (1965).
27 18 Cal. 2d 863, 118 P.2d 465 (1941).
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will result. Such a tort has been labeled "willful negligence," "wanton and
willful negligence," "wanton and willful nsconduct," and even "gross negli-
gence." It is most accurately designated as wanton and reckless nmsconduct. It
involves no intention, as does willful misconduct, to do harm, and it differs from
negligence in that it does involve an intention to perform an act that the actor
knows, or should know, will very probably cause harm.2 8
A close analysis of this statement, however, leads to the conclusion that the court
in fact makes no distinction between wilful misconduct and wanton misconduct.
The opimon uses "willful nnsconduct" as an equivalent of "intentional tort." The
example used by the court to describe "willful misconduct" is assault and battery,
the classic example of an intentional tort. Furthermore, the court says that "willful
misconduct" involves an intent to do harm. Yet California courts have indicated
that "willful misconduct" as used m the guest statute involves no intent to injure.29
It appears that what the Donnelly court has done, perhaps injudiciously, is to
substitute "willful" for "intentional" and then to postulate a new term, "wanton
and reckless," to take the place of "willfil" as it is commonly used.30
If "wanton and reckless" is synonymous with "wilful misconduct," why then
is the former used to define the latter? The term "wanton and reckless" was intro-
duced into the California definition of wilful misconduct in a quotation from a
Massachusetts case 31 in Helme v. Great Western Milling Co. 32 Under Massachu-
setts law, "wanton" and "wilful" are distinguishable. 'Wilful" is synonymous with
intentional, while "wanton" is used to describe the "grey" area between negligence
and intentional conduct. One who acts wantonly "is so utterly indifferent to the
rights of others that he acts as if such rights did not exist."38 Evidently the Cali-
28 Id. at 869, 118 P.2d at 468-69.
29 Reuther v. Viall, 62 Cal. 2d 470, 475, 42 Cal. Rptr. 456, 459, 398 P.2d 792, 795
(1965); Hallman v. Richards, 123 Cal. App. 2d 274, 279, 266 P.2d 812, 814 (1954);
Van Fleet v. Heyler, 51 Cal. App. 2d '719, 730, 125 P.2d 586, 592 (1942). But see
Hagglund v. Nelson, 23 Cal. App. 2d 348, 353, 73 P.2d 265, 268 (1937) (wilful mis-
conduct may include intentional injury).
a0 This confusion between "wilful," "wanton," and "reckless" is not peculiar to the
Califorma courts. BEnmy, AuvromoBrms § 2.340 (7th ed. 1935) says, "'Wantonness,' as
in the operation of an automobile, is the conscious doing of some act or the omission of
some duty with knowledge of existing conditions, and conscious that, from the act or
omission, injury will likely result to another." On the other hand, 4 BLAsHFMI , CYcLo-
PEDTA OF AUToMOBuLE LAW AND PRACTCE: 110 (Permanent ed. 1935) states, "Wilful
misconduct is the intentional doing of something which should not be done, or the inten-
tional failure to do something which should be done, in the operation of the automobile,
under circumstances tending to disclose the operator's knowledge, express or implied, that
an injury to the guest will be a probable result of such conduct." If it is assumed that
both of these authorities are correct, then it is apparent that "wanton" and "wilfl" are
synonymous.
The Califorma courts have reached a silar conclusion when dealing with CAL.
V icLE CODE § 23103, where reckless driving has been held to mean wilful misconduct.
People v. Young, 20 Cal. 2d 832, 837, 129 P.2d 353, 356 (1942); Harlow v. Van Dusen,
137 Cal. App. 2d 547, 550, 290 P.2d 911, 913 (1955).
31 In re Burns, 218 Mass. 8, 105 N.E. 601 (1914).
8243 Cal. App. 416, 421, 185 Pac. 510, 512 (1919).
33 Isaason v. Boston, Wor. & N.Y. St. Ry., 278 Mass. 378, 387, 180 N.E. 118, in
(1932).
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forma court in Helme adopted the Massachusetts terms, but not the definition of
those terms. Rather it applied the California definitions which, as has been shown,
are identical. Thus the definition of wilful misconduct becomes "intentional, wrong-
ful conduct, done with knowledge that serious injury to the guest probably will
result."
Knowledge
This synthesis of the first clauses of the Howard and Reuther definitions indi-
cates that wilful misconduct contains two essential elerents--'knowledge" and
"intent."34 "Knowledge" is a subjective concept. Only the actor is capable of
stating what he 'knows" at any particular moment. Thus the courts, realizing that
a guest, if required to demonstrate that a driver had actual knowledge of the
probable consequences of his act, would in effect have to establish at least an intent
to do bodily harm,3 5 held from the earliest cases that knowledge may be either
actual or implied from the circumstances.3 6
This, however, did not change the subjective nature of the term. Implied
knowledge was interpreted to mean the knowledge that the actor must have had,
rather than the knowledge he should have had.37 The use of implied knowledge did
not relieve the inherent difficulty of satisfying the requirement of knowledge. This
is exemplified by McLeod v. Dutton,38 where the driver, on a foggy mght, raced
another car, pulled over to the wrong side of the road to pass at a speed greater
than seventy miles per hour, swung back to the right, and collided with a third
car crossing the highway. The court held there was no wilful misconduct, since
it could find no knowledge on the part of the driver, either express or implied, that
there was a probability that his guest ught be injured.
While the Califorma courts were struggling with a subjective test of knowledge,
an objective test was available in the Restatement of Torts, where, using "reckless"
in place of "wilful risconduct,"3 9 it was suggested that:
In order that the actor's conduct may be reckless, it is not necessary that he
himself recognize it as being extremely dangerous. His inability to realize the
danger may be due to his own reckless temperament or to the abnormally favor-
able results of previous conduct of the same sort. It is enough that he knows or
has reason to know of circumstances which would bring home to the realization
of the ordinary, reasonable man the highly dangerous character of his conduct.4o
84 "[Bloth the element of intent and the element of knowledge of the probability
of resulting injury must be present in order to constitute wilful misconduct." Browne
v. Fernandez, 140 Cal. App. 689, 696, 36 P.2d 122, 125 (1934).
35 Cope v. Davison, 30 Cal. 2d 193, 207, 180 P.2d 873, 881 (1947) (dissent).36 Helme v. Great Western Milling Co., 43 Cal. App. 416, 421, 185 Pac. 510, 512
(1919).
3 7 This is clearly shown in the earlier cases. Compare Norton v. Puter, 138 Cal. App.
253, 32 P.2d 172 (1934) (wilful misconduct found, in that the driver must have known
probable consequences) with Howard v. Howard, 132 Cal. App. 124, 22 P.2d 279 (1933)
(fact that driver should have known the probable consequences of his act was not
sufficient proof of knowledge).
38 13 Cal. App. 2d 545, 57 P.2d 189 (1936).
3 9 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 500, special note (1934).
40 Id. § 500, comment c. This provision is now RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TORTS
§ 500, comment c (1965). Furthermore, an early California case, Harrington v. Los
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The first allusion to the objective "reasonable man" standard of knowledge in Cali-
fornia was in 1937,41 but it was not until 1939 that a California court said: "The
probability of injury must have been an apparent consequence to a man of
ordinary prudence and intelligence." 42 Two years later, in Rawlins v. Lory,43 the
court said, "In determining whether the circumstances are sufficient to disclose
implied knowledge of such probability [of injury to a guest], an external standard
is implied."44 The suggested objective test was discussed and approved in Van
Fleet v. Heyler 5 and has been applied in most subsequent wilful misconduct
cases.
Tis objective test does not obviate the distinction between negligence and
wilful misconduct. 46 The knowledge supplied by the reasonable man test for
negligence is the knowledge of the peril to be apprehended; that is, the knowledge
*of the circumstances under wich the actor has acted. The knowledge supplied by
the reasonable man test for wilful misconduct is, on the other hand, the knowledge
of the probability of injury; that is, knowledge of the consequences. 47
Of course, when proving wilful misconduct, there must also be shown a
knowledge of the facts or circumstances. Tis knowledge must be actual, although
it may be implied from circumstantial evidence. 48 If this were not true, a con-
structive knowledge of consequences could be predicated upon a fictional knowl-
edge of facts, and every case of negligence could become a case of wilful miscon-
duct. The Restatement of Torts illustrates the problem with the following example:
Intentionally driving through a known stop sign into an intersection may be wilful
misconduct, whereas the same failure to stop may merely be negligence if the
driver, although knowing of the existence of the stop sign, inadvertently failed to
realize that he was approaching the intersection. 49 "Wilful or wanton misconduct
cannot be found by charging a driver with knowledge of facts which he did not
have, but which would have been known to the man of ordinary prudence ,
Intent
The element of intent has been interpreted by the,zourts in a confused man-
ner.5 Intent, in the context of wilful misconduct, is more than merely a conscious
Angeles Ry., 140 Cal. 514, 523, 74 Pac. 15, 18 (1903), dealing with the alleged
wilful misconduct of a streetcar motorman charged with running over a bicyclist, said,
in defining the "actual or implied knowledge" requirement of wilful misconduct: "Thls,
however, does not mean that defendant must know that injury is inevitable if he fails
to exercise care, and the decisions indicate no such requirement. It is enough that the
circumstances of which the defendant has knowledge are such as to convey to the mind
of a reasonable man a question as to whether the other party wil be able to escape the
threatened injury."
41 Jones v. Hathaway, 22 Cal. App. 2d 316, 320-21, 70 P.2d 681, 683 (1937).42 Stacey v. Hayes, 31 Cal. App. 2d 422, 426, 88 P.2d 165, 167 (1939).
4344 Cal. App. 2d 20, 111 P.2d 973 (1941).
44 Id. at 24, 111 P.2d at 975.
4551 Cal. App. 2d 719, 728-30, 125 P.2d 586, 591-92 (1942).46 Lovett v. Hitchcock, 192 Cal. App. 2d 806, 813, 14 Cal. Rptr. 117, 121 (1961).
47 Id. at 812, 14 Cal. Rptr. at 120.
48 Ibid.
49 RsTAeramr (SEcoND), ToRTs § 500 comment b (1965).50 Lovett v. Hitchcock, 192 Cal. App. 2d 806, 812-13, 14 Cal. Rptr. 117, 121 (1961).
51 See, e.g., Wright v. Sellers, 25 Cal. App. 2d 603, 613, 78 P.2d 209, 215 (1938).
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act or failure to act. It is a state of mind evidencing either a willingness that in-
jury occur or an utter disregard of consequences. 52 Yet, intent, much like "knowl-
edge," is a subjective concept and as such is incapable of accurate determination.
Early cases requiring actual proof of the element of intent led to results such as
that m Halter v. Malone,53 where a driver, seeing a truck emerge from a driveway
ahead of bim, maintained his speed toward the truck m the belief that he could
pass behind it, between it and the curb. The truck, however, started moving back
toward the driveway. The car did not slow until it was witbin thirty feet of the
truck, at whch time it was too late to avoid a collision. The court, in reversing a
judgment entered on a verdict which required a jury finding of wilful misconduct,
held that there was a lack of substantial evidence of an intention on the part of
the driver to act m "wanton and reckless" disregard of possible results and that
the conduct was, at worst, gross negligence.
Community standards, however, are not subjective m nature, and, in the words
of Mr. Justice Cardozo: "A jurisprudence that is not constantly brought into re-
lation to objective or external standards, incurs the risk of degenerating into what
the Germans call Die Gefiiblsjunsprudenz, a jurisprudence of mere sentiment or
feeling."54 Although the courts were loathe to dispense with the necessity of prov-
ing subjective intent in wilful msconduct, they realized that such an entirely sub-
jective standard was impractical in that a driver will rarely admit to having driven
with the requisite culpable intention. 55 To remedy this situation the courts in-
dulged in a legal fiction. The actor's conduct was characterized as wilful through
a permissive inference that the aggravated misconduct was intended. 56
The final step in the transmutation of intent from a subjective to an objective
concept was reached in two recent cases. In Pelletti v. Membrila57 the court states:
"[W]hen conduct falls sufficiently below the acceptable norm to become grossly de-
ficient, we characterize it as imbued with a bad intent which we call wilful mis-
conduct. We attribute a malicious state of mind to the actor irrespective of any
actual specific intent." 8 Similarly, in Chappell v. Palmer. 59 "[Ihe pragmatic test
that has evolved in wilful misconduct cases is whether a reasonable man under
the same or similar circumstances as those faced by the actor would be aware of
the dangerous character of his conduct."60 Although these two statements appear,
In the superior court trial of Hastings v. Serleto, 61 Cal. App. 2d 672, 143 P.2d 956
(1943), the trial judge referred to California Jury Instructions' standard instruction on
wilful misconduct as impossible, mprobable and confusmg. Brief for Appellant, p. 29,
Record, vol. 1778, p. 222, San Francisco County Law Library, Hastings v. Serleto, supra.62 Weber v. Pinyan, 9 Cal. 2d 226, 233-34, 70 P.2d 183, 187 (1937).
5311 Cal. App. 2d 79, 53 P.2d 374 (1935).
54 CAiuDozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process, m SErLcram WmtINGs OF BEN-
jAmIN NATiuN CA nozo 151 (Hall ed. 1947).
66 Hoffman v. Slocum, 219 Cal. App. 2d 100, 102-03, 32 Cal. Rptr. 635, 637 (1963);
Levizon v. Harrison, 198 Cal. App. 2d 274, 281, 18 Cal. Rptr. 284, 288 (1961); Hastings
v. Serleto, 61 Cal. App. 2d 672, 680-81, 143 P.2d 956, 960 (1943).
56Van Fleet v. Heyler, 51 Cal. App. 2d 719, 125 P.2d 586 (1942). Pelletti v.
Membrila, 234 Cal. App. 2d 606, 610, 44 Cal. Rptr. 588, 590 (1965), has interpreted this
case as containing an assumption that the wilful misconduct was intended.
57 Supra note 56.
58 Id. at 611, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 591.
69236 A.C.A. 35, 45 Cal. Rptr. 686 (1965).
60 Id. at 38, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 688.
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at first, to eliminate the element of intent from wilful misconduct, such is not the
case. In Pelletti, following the above statement, the court says:
But if specific proof of the wanton state of mind of the actor is also produced,
then a dual case has been made for the plaintiff, who has the advantage of the pre-
sumption which follows from aggravated misconduct as well as specific evidence
from which the presence of malicious intent may be mferred.61
Certainly, here, the court is not denying the existence of intent in wilful miscon-
duct. The intent, however, need not be proved by the plaintiff. The problem pre-
sented is whether the presumption of the existence of "a malicious state of mind" is
a conclusive or rebuttable presumption. The presumption indulged in here is
similar in form to that in section 1963(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, which
presumes an unlawful intent from the commission of an unlawful act.62 This is a
rebuttable presumption, but it would seem that in the Pelletti definition it should
be interpreted as conclusive. There can be no willingness to injure, nor can there
be disregard of probable consequences, without a prior knowledge of the conse-
quences. Conversely, it seems logical that an act done with knowledge of the prob-
ability of ensuing injury should conclusively evince such willingness or disregard
as is termed intent with respect to wilful misconduct.
In the Chappell v. Palmer definition there is no mention of the element of
intent, but the entire definition deals with the problem of intent, for it was ren-
dered in response to the court's own question: "[W]hat test should be applied to
determine the suficiency of circumstantial evidence of mtent?"63 Since the exis-
tence of wilful misconduct is a question of fact,64 it logically follows that any ele-
ment of wilful misconduct, such as intent, is a matter of fact. What this means,
according to Chappell, is that if there is any substantial evidence in support of the
jury's finding, the verdict will not be overturned by an appellate court. "Sub-
stantial evidence" in this context is evidence which a fair and reasonable mind
would accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Thus the reasonable man stan-
dard may also be applied in determining the existence of an intent, which is still
considered to be an integral part of wilful misconduct.
Validity of Definitions
The definitions of wilful misconduct set out by the recent cases are unquestion-
ably the clearest and most workable propounded by the courts, but may be of
questionable validity when considered in context with the California automobile
guest statute. Guest statutes are in derogation of the common law right of recovery
for a loss caused by another's negligence, 65 and thus the courts have required that
they be strictly construed. 66 However, in opposition to this and in accord with the
61234 Cal. App. 2d at 611, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 591.
62 This section of the code has recently been repealed, and will have no effect after
January 1, 1967. Cal. Stat. 1965, ch. 299, § 2, at 1298 and § 110, at 1363. Reasons for
the repeal are given in 7 REPORTS, RiEcolmm A o Ns, AND S-rIms OF = CA.xoaRMA
LAw REvisioN CoamfissioN 341 (1965).
63 Chappell v. Palmer, 236 A.C.A. 35, 37, 45 Cal. Rptr. 686, 688 (1965).
64 See, e.g., Levizon v. Harrison, 198 Cal. App. 2d 274, 279-80, 18 Cal. Rptr. 284,
287 (1961).
65 Prager v. Isreal, 15 Cal. 2d 89, 93, 98 P.2d 729, 731 (1940).
66 Prager v. Isreal, 15 Cal. 2d 89, 93, 98 P.2d 729, 731 (1940); Rocha v. Hulen, 6
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legislative intent of discouraging collusive suits between a guest and his host, most
earlier decisions, instead of construing the statute strictly, construed the terms of
the statute, especially "wilful misconduct," strictly. Due to this narrow interpreta-
tion of "wilful misconduct" the guest statute was actually applied broadly, con-
trary to the judicial policy of attempting to preserve common law rights of recovery
wherever possible. The recent cases of Pelletti,67 Chappell68 and Reuther,69 how-
ever, cannot be said to construe "wilful misconduct" strictly. 70 Dean Prosser says
that when the intent element of wilful misconduct is determined by an objective
standard, as it was in the abovementioned cases,
"wilful," "wanton!" or "reckless" conduct tends to take on the aspect of highly
unreasonable conduct, or an extreme departure from ordinary care, in a situation
where a high degree of danger is apparent. As a result there is often no clear dis-
tinction at all between such conduct and "gross" negligence, and the two have
tended to merge and take on the same meaning, of an aggravated form of negli-
gence, differing in quality rather than in degree from ordinary lack of care.71
The Califorma courts have not gone so far as to equate wilful misconduct and
gross negligence. There is still a difference, in that to find wilful misconduct there
must be demonstrated a knowledge of the probable consequences in addition to a
knowledge of the facts and circumstances, while in negligence there need be
knowledge only of the latter. The Califormia courts have "elasticized" the definition
of wilful misconduct in order to encompass borderline guest statute cases. The
objectivity of the definition, insofar as it no longer requires proof of actual knowl-
edge or intent, makes it easier for a plaintiff to get his case to the jury. The broad
and indefinite terms of the newer definition and the broadened interpretations of
the older definitions of wilful misconduct give the court more freedom and admit
of the sustaining of verdicts which would be set aside under the old, strict defi-
nition.72 It appears that wilful misconduct has become a sort of existentialist
concept, taking on that meaning demanded by public policy and expressed through
judicial interpretation.
Again adopting the words of Mr. Justice Cardozo:
[T]he tendency today is in the direction of a growing liberalism. The new spirit
has made its way gradually; and its progress, unnoticed step by step, is visible in
retrospect as we look back upon the distance traversed. The old forms remain, but
they are filled with a new content. We are getting away from the conception
of a lawsuit either as a mathematical problem or as a sportsman's game. We
Cal. App. 2d 245, 254, 44 P.2d 478, 483 (1935).
67 234 Cal. App. 2d 606, 44 Cal. Rptr. 588 (1965).
68236 A.C.A. 35, 45 Cal. Rptr. 686 (1965).
6962 Cal. 2d 470, 42 Cal. Rptr. 456, 398 P.2d 792 (1965).
7O Compare Reuther v. Viall, supra note 69 (wilful misconduct) with Porter v.
Hofnan, 12 Cal. 2d 445, 85 P.2d 447 (1938) (no wilful misconduct).
7 1 PPossEP ToRTs 189 (3d ed. 1964).
72 Compare Reuther v. Viall, 62 Cal. 2d 470, 42 Cal. Rptr. 456, 398 P.2d 792 (1965)
(wilful misconduct in taking eyes off road) with Bartlett v. Jackson, 13 Cal. App. 2d 435,
56 P.2d 1298 (1936) and Porter v. Hofinan, 12 Cal. 2d 445, 85 P.2d 447 (1938) (no
wilful misconduct). Compare Hill v. Perry, 224 Cal. App. 2d 290, 36 Cal. Rptr. 530
(1964) (wilful misconduct; faulty brakes caused car to swerve into oncoming traffic)
with Spencer v. Scott, 39 Cal. App. 2d 109, 102 P.2d 554 (1940) (no wilful misconduct).
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